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states that he told Bush about the dangers the 
United States would face in Iraq after ousting 
Saddam but maintains that the US President 
was “adamant” (p. 203) about the need for 
an invasion. Despite his misgivings, King 
Abdullah was not prepared to defy Bush in 
ways that would endanger US aid and other 
support to Jordan. The King’s strategy was 
therefore to work with the US Administra-
tion but to limit the cooperation and main-
tain such support in a low-profile way. King 
Abdullah acknowledges a much more lim-
ited Jordanian non-combat support role for 
the 2003 invasion of Iraq than has been de-
scribed in other sources, including accounts 
by general Tommy Franks and Ambassador 
L. Paul Bremer. Following Bush’s departure 
from power, King Abdullah viewed President 
Barack Obama as a much more sympathetic 
partner, although he remains frustrated by a 
lack of progress in the peace process. 
King Abdullah also uses this book as an 
opportunity to speak against terrorism and 
emphasize the virtues of moderate Islam. As 
part of this effort, he devotes a short chapter to 
the Amman Message, which outlines the Jor-
danian stand against terrorism in the name of 
Islam and other extremist dogmas (pp. 257–
263). The King also adds considerable detail 
about al-Qa‘ida’s attempt to assassinate him 
in the greek Islands in 2000. Moreover, the 
author is quite candid about efforts to hunt 
down Jordanian-born al-Qa‘ida leader, Abu 
Musab al Zarqawi for his crimes against Jor-
dan. He maintains that after al-Qa‘ida’s No-
vember 2005 bombing of three Amman lux-
ury hotels, “Jordanian intelligence operatives 
and agents flooded into Iraq, searching for 
information that might lead us to Zarqawi’s 
hideout” (p. 255). King Abdullah notes that 
his intelligence officials worked closely with 
the United States and helped to orchestrate 
Zarqawi’s death in a US air raid against a se-
cret headquarters in Iraq. 
The book contains a number of interesting 
anecdotes, such as Abdullah’s troubled and un-
easy encounters with Saddam Husayn’s sons 
Uday and Qusay. The strange interactions of 
then Prince Abdullah with his hosts on a trip 
to North Korea are recounted in a humorous 
way, suggesting that the culture clash could 
hardly have been greater. More significantly, 
there is also an interesting summary of how 
King Abdullah agreed to a request by Iranian 
President Mohammad Khatami’s government 
to help serve as an intermediary with the Bush 
Administration to help improve relations. 
These efforts came to nothing, and King Ab-
dullah notes that Jordanian-Iranian relations 
also quickly declined due to differences over 
post-Saddam Iraq and also as a result of the 
election of Mahmud Ahmadinejad. Perhaps 
the most amusing account in his entire nar-
rative is a discussion of how an evangelical 
US Congressman grabbed the King and de-
manded to know if Jesus was his savior. Such 
incidents indicate that it is not always easy to 
be the leader of a small state seeking to im-
prove its relations with the rest of the world. 
Nevertheless, King Abdullah is clearly his fa-
ther’s son, and this work helps to reveal why 
the Hashemite government is likely to hold on 
to its authority even as other governments in 
the region have fallen or may soon fall. 
W. Andrew Terrill, PhD is a research pro-
fessor at the US Army War College at Car-
lisle Barracks, PA and the author of global 
Security Watch Jordan (Praeger, 2010). 
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With the winding down of the American 
military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan 
together with increased instability in Paki-
stan, a number of thoughtful books have be-
gun to appear assessing America’s approach 
towards the region and US foreign policy in 
general. Steven glain’s important contribu-
tion, State vs. Defense: The Battle to Define 
America’s Empire, is a welcome addition to 
this list. While other authors have generally 
focused on more narrow aspects of these 
conflicts, glain takes a broader approach, 
calling into question the apparent militari-
zation of US foreign policy.
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abroad while overlooking its crippling weak-
nesses at home. Today, they counsel an armed 
onslaught against an Islamist movement that 
cannot be subdued by force.
Even worse, warns glain, these elements 
in the Washington establishment have dispar-
aged not only the agents of diplomacy but 
diplomacy itself, impoverishing the State 
Department and the US Agency for Interna-
tional Development (USAID) and compel-
ling the military to fill a growing share of 
what were once the roles and responsibilities 
of civilians. A simple sign of this sad state of 
affairs has been pointed out by Robert gates, 
who has observed that there are more mem-
bers of military marching bands than make 
up the entire US Foreign Service.
glain’s book comes at a watershed mo-
ment, when the US, prompted by budgetary 
stress, is reconsidering its commitments 
around the world. It provides an impas-
sioned but logical plea for the return of 
American ideals and principles in the coun-
try’s foreign policy starting with the resto-
ration of the State Department to its right-
ful place. While it is too early to tell what 
impact glain’s work will have on Wash-
ington’s approach towards the world, it is 
safe to say that in informed circles, it has a 
good chance to achieve the status of Joseph 
Nye’s 2002 work, The Paradox of American 
Power a book which transformed the way in 
which power is viewed. Hopefully, building 
a new foreign policy that combines Nye’s 
“smart power” blueprint with glain’s call 
for rebalancing of State and Defense will 
enable America to find its way through the 
challenging times ahead.
Robert Looney, Naval Postgraduate School
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Michael M. gunter is Professor of Po-
litical Science at Tennessee Technological 
University, an internationally recognized 
scholar, and a well-published specialist on 
the Kurds, Turks, and Armenians. Unfor-
Over the years, various writers and poli-
ticians have warned of the potential dangers 
associated with an over-emphasis on the 
military. The Founding Fathers feared noth-
ing more than the corrosive properties of a 
standing army. Even Alexander Hamilton, 
no “dove” by any measure, warned against 
a permanent military class.
In 1961, President Dwight D. Eisenhow-
er’s farewell address warned the nation to 
guard against the influence of a rising “mili-
tary-industrial complex.” That nexus of mili-
tary, industrial, technological, and congres-
sional interests has expanded considerably 
since Eisenhower’s cautionary speech. Even 
Robert gates, the former Director of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Secretary 
of Defense to both Presidents george W. Bush 
and Barack Obama, has lamented the militari-
zation of America’s presence overseas. glain 
goes further, concluding that America has lost 
its way, deviating from a foreign policy repre-
senting the ideals of the Founding Fathers to 
one dominated by purely military consider-
ations. This militarization has not only under-
mined American values, but also eroded the 
United States’ standing in the world and in the 
process weakened US national security.
glain’s contribution is to carefully docu-
ment how we got to this sad state of affairs. 
In doing so, he takes us on a fascinating his-
torical journey in which he clearly shows that 
American militarism is unique for its civilian 
provenance. As he notes, “it did not follow a 
barracks coup or a popular call for a man on 
horseback to impose order on an unraveling 
republic. No martial law was declared and 
there is no military cabal pulling the strings 
of a nominal civilian authority. In fact, it is 
largely civilians who have played the domi-
nant role in weaponizing foreign policy 
abroad and security policy at home” (p. 3).
Of the militarists profiled by glain, only 
two of them — generals Douglas MacArthur 
and Curtis LeMay — were military men. The 
balance consists mostly of legislators and civil 
servants who for various reasons conditioned 
the country for needless wars and manipulat-
ed presidents into waging them. As he notes, 
for much of the Cold War, they believed in a 
communist monolith that never existed. Until 
the day the Berlin Wall fell, they promoted 
Pentagon exaggerations of Soviet power 
